Policy development for environmental licensing and biodiversity offsets in Latin America by Villarroya-Ballarín, A. (Ana) et al.
Policy Development for Environmental Licensing and
Biodiversity Offsets in Latin America
Ana Villarroya1*, Ana Cristina Barros2, Joseph Kiesecker3
1 The Nature Conservancy, Boulder, Colorado, United States of America, 2 The Nature Conservancy, Brasilia, Brazil, 3 The Nature Conservancy, Fort Collins, Colorado,
United States of America
Abstract
Attempts to meet biodiversity goals through application of the mitigation hierarchy have gained wide traction globally with
increased development of public policy, lending standards, and corporate practices. With interest in biodiversity offsets
increasing in Latin America, we seek to strengthen the basis for policy development through a review of major
environmental licensing policy frameworks in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. Here we
focused our review on an examination of national level policies to evaluate to which degree current provisions promote
positive environmental outcomes. All the surveyed countries have national-level Environmental Impact Assessment laws or
regulations that cover the habitats present in their territories. Although most countries enable the use of offsets only Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico and Peru explicitly require their implementation. Our review has shown that while advancing quite
detailed offset policies, most countries do not seem to have strong requirements regarding impact avoidance. Despite this
deficiency most countries have a strong foundation from which to develop policy for biodiversity offsets, but several issues
require further guidance, including how best to: (1) ensure conformance with the mitigation hierarchy; (2) identify the most
environmentally preferable offsets within a landscape context; (3) determine appropriate mitigation replacement ratios; and
(4) ensure appropriate time and effort is given to monitor offset performance.
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Introduction
Over the next two decades, governments and companies will
invest unprecedented sums – well over 20 trillion dollars – in
development projects around the world, from Argentina to
Zambia. Rapidly developing countries are making trillion dollar
investments in infrastructure. For example, Latin America is in the
midst of unprecedented and sustained growth in development as
worldwide demand for the region’s mineral, agricultural, and
energy wealth grows [1,2]. The region will need to construct more
roads, energy facilities, and mines as this economic development
continues. To be sustainable it is important to ascertain how this
development can be done in a way that minimizes impacts and
maximizes the benefits to nature and people. It will require that we
find ways to balance the seemingly conflicting goals of improving
infrastructure, increasing food production, and expanding access
to reliable energy and housing while also preserving and protecting
the biodiversity and ecosystem services of the region. To
simultaneously achieve these goals will be challenging and require
that development is complemented by public and private
investments to prevent the loss of biodiversity and ecosystem
services.
Environmental licensing processes, such as Environmental
Impact Assessment (EIA) play a critical role in controlling the
way development projects result in damage to the environment. In
most countries developers are required to get an environmental
license before development activities can be implemented, and
currently EIA has been legally adopted in almost all countries in
the world [3]. Obtaining such permit usually depends on the way
the predicted negative impacts will be mitigated, or depends on the
fulfillment of additional requirements set by the licensing
authority. EIA is a systematic, iterative process that examines
the environmental consequences of planned developments and
emphasizes prediction and prevention of environmental damage
[4]. The mitigation of environmental impacts is thus a key stage of
the environmental impact assessment process and lies at its core
[5]. Practitioners seek to reduce impacts through application of the
mitigation hierarchy: avoid, minimize, restore, and offset [6]. To
avoid impacts on biodiversity, measures are taken to prevent
creating impacts from the outset, such as careful spatial or
temporal placement of elements of infrastructure. In minimization,
measures are taken to reduce the duration, intensity, and/or
extent of impacts that cannot be completely avoided. In
restoration, measures are taken to rehabilitate degraded ecosys-
tems or restore cleared ecosystems after impacts that cannot be
completely avoided and/or minimized. To offset impacts measures
are taken to compensate for any residual adverse impacts that
cannot be avoided, minimized, and/or restored. Offsets can take
the form of positive management interventions such as restoration
of degraded habitat, arrested degradation or averted risk, or
protecting areas where there is imminent or projected loss of
biodiversity [7,8]. Attempts to meet biodiversity goals through
application of the mitigation hierarchy have gained wide traction
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globally with increased development of public policy, lending
standards, and corporate policy. In the public policy sector there
are approximately 45 compensatory mitigation programs for
biodiversity impacts worldwide, with another 27 programs in
development [9]. In the financial sector, major institutions
including the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and more
than 70 Equator Principles financial institutions that base their
requirements on IFC’s Performance Standards are requiring
projects they finance to adhere to the mitigation hierarchy. This
means they should seek to avoid impacts on biodiversity and
ecosystem services or - where this is not possible - to minimize or
restore them. In critical habitats, this also means achieving net
gains of biodiversity values for which these habitats have been
designated. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) also has similar requirements [10–12]. As new perfor-
mance standards and public policies drive mitigation biodiversity
goals from a voluntary objective into the sphere of compliance,
businesses (especially mining companies) are increasingly adopting
it into corporate biodiversity management policies and mitigation
practices as a normal way/cost of doing business [13–15].
With interest in biodiversity offsets increasing in Latin America,
we seek to strengthen the basis for policy development through a
review of major environmental licensing policy frameworks in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela
(Figure 1). We focused on these countries because they represent
,85% of the area of all Central and South America and ,80% of
the population of the region. Since we relied mainly on colleagues
to identify and interpret policy documents we focused on countries
where The Nature Conservancy has country level programs and
staff available. We recognize the limitation of this approach but
also do not consider this sample of countries to be a random
sample intended to capture broader patterns in other countries
found in the region. By comparing the goals, approaches, and key
issues highlighted in these frameworks, and distilling important
commonalities and differences, our aim is to provide guidance to
countries that have not yet developed frameworks and to support
improvements in existing policies. The frameworks selected for
review include both established offset programs and rapidly
emerging policies. With this analysis we sought to explore and
analyze the role mitigation hierarchy and, more specifically, offsets
are given in different Latin-American legal frameworks. First we
conducted a broad review of policies related to the environmental
licensing process, because the ecological effectiveness of mitigation
depends heavily on the existence of strong environmental laws and
regulations [16]. We then reviewed current offset frameworks from
the selected countries. Finally we highlight negative and positive
aspects of each countries mitigation frameworks as a guide to
improve existing tools or proposal of new ones.
Methods
We focused our review on national (federal) level policies to
assess how current requirements would affect implementation of
the mitigation hierarchy and promote positive environmental
outcomes. State and provincial policies have not been included in
this study. Although they are necessary to respond to local
environmental contexts, the paper focuses on national policies
because (a) the constitution of Chile, Colombia, Peru only allow
for all laws to be established at the national level [17–19]. In
addition in Venezuela environmental laws are only made at the
national level [20]. Decisions on environmental licensing in
Mexico are context dependent with large scale impacts (e.g. oil
and gas, large hydropower, forest clearing, roads and railways)
regulated at the federal level while localized environment impacts
(e.g. urban expansion, small hydropower) are made at the state
level [21,22]. (b) National/federal policies often establish a
common base for more specific documents such as state or
provincial policies [23,24]. (c) Infrastructure projects are often
large and may affect more than one province or state. Thus we
decided to focus on national level policies that would govern these
types of projects. We sought to include three primary sources to
gather and assess existing policies: 1. Official websites of each
country’s Ministry of the Environment (or equivalent agency), and
any official agencies involved with the country’s environmental
licensing processes. 2. Published articles and reports about EIA
and offset procedures in the selected countries. 3. Interviews with
persons directly engaged in the mitigation agenda in each country.
These interviews also helped ensure we interpreted the legal texts
correctly. The interviews also helped confirm that all relevant legal
texts had been selected and that we were not missing any
information. For a complete list of sources used in our analysis see
Table S1 and Appendix S1. We focused our analysis on existing
policies and laws but we also included the new offsets law in Peru,
that is about to be signed into law.
While a policy analysis may provide interesting and relevant
information, it also has limitations that cannot be overlooked [25].
We acknowledge that environmental policies are numerous, varied
and constantly changing, and the information they contain can be
sometimes misinterpreted. Thus, even though all effort has been
made to find and comprehensively review all relevant policies, we
acknowledge that there is a chance that some regulations or
information were missed. In those cases, we state that ‘‘no
information has been found’’ instead of ‘‘no information exists on
the subject’’. Also, we must keep in mind that policies are in most
aspects qualitative and difficult to compare and/or evaluate in a
standard way that leaves little place to subjective interpretation.
We have tried to overcome this handicap as much as possible by
setting a list of specific and well defined questions to answer when
reviewing the selected texts (see below).
Review of Policies Related to Application of the
Mitigation Hierarchy
To assess how a countries environmental licensing process
would promote positive conservation outcomes we have reviewed
national legal texts related to EIA processes and mitigation for
infrastructure projects. We focused on general environmental
policies, such as environmental acts as these laws often make
provisions for EIA, or establish how mitigation activities are
carried out. We also paid attention to sector-specific policies, since
it is common to find specifications on how EIA shall be carried out
for certain types of development (i.e. mining) projects, or require
specific mitigation measures for particular types of development.
In addition we also examined habitat/area-specific policies (e.g.
wetlands), since sometimes they include provisions related to
impact mitigation [26].
Although our analysis examined some aspects of the EIA
process it was not intended as a detailed review of these
procedures. Impact assessments are highly technical processes,
whose success depends on the quality of the regulatory require-
ments, availability of analytical tools and technical capacity. Here
we focused on aspects of EIA that we think influence implemen-
tation of the mitigation hierarchy. Moreover several publications
have conducted broader analysis of EIA process in the region,
including operational and implementation issues [27–31]. In
addition a recent review by Reid et al. (in prep.) analyzes the SEA
procedures in the region. To evaluate mitigation frameworks as
the basis for offset practices, our assessment is focused on
regulatory features directly related to impact mitigation, mainly:
Environmental Licensing and Offset Policies in Latin America
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impact evaluation and the use of the mitigation hierarchy. The
aim is to assess to what extent the reviewed policies set
requirements that may eventually promote solid mitigation
practices. This portion of our analysis serves as the starting point
for the more detailed review of offset frameworks, see below.
To standardize the review as much as possible, we have defined
a set of questions that have been answered for each country on a
yes/no basis, depending on the contents of their laws and
regulations (Appendix S2). We grouped policies for the review as
follows: General (policies that apply to all projects: environmental
acts, general EIA, and habitat-specific laws and regulations), and
Sector-specific (mining, hydrocarbons, energy (electricity), trans-
port infrastructure (i.e. roads, railways, airports and ports), and
waste management). All the projects covered under these policies
also have to follow the requirements set by general laws and
regulations, so the sectorial provisions supplement the general
ones.
Review of Offset Specific Policies and Laws
Our assessment of the environmental licensing processes of the
seven countries identified four (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and
Peru) that have developed specific policies that regulate offset
implementation (Table 1). For these four countries we focused on
the following laws that dictated offset usage:
In Brazil projects subject to environmental licensing must offset
their impacts on environmental assets. Impacts on Protected Areas
(Law 9985 of 2000), caves (Decree 6640 of 2006) and coastal
native vegetation (Decree 5300 of 2004) shall always be offset,
although the environmental authority (IBAMA) may require the
developer to offset any other residual impacts identified. In
addition to these laws, Law 12651 of 2012 (on the Protection of
Native Vegetation) regulates offsets for impacts to native
vegetation, although these are not required for obtaining an
environmental license so we will not examine it in this paper. In
this case, our review will focus on the framework first set by Law
9985 of 2000 (see Table 1).
In Colombia projects subject to EIA must offset their impacts on
terrestrial ecosystems (as regulated by Resolution 1517 of 2012)
and freshwater (Law 99 of 1993, Decree 1900 of 2006 and Decree
1933 of 1994). In addition there are some offset requirements for
impacts to forests (Decree 1791 of 1996) as well as several specific
activities (Resolutions that implement TORs for elaborating EISs,
see Table S1). However, these latter policies only address a few
aspects related to offset implementation, so they cannot be
considered equal to the 2012 law focused on terrestrial ecosystems.
For this country we will focus the review on this 2012 framework
(see Table 1).
In Mexico the Sustainable Forest Development Act of 2003
requires offsets for impacts that result in land-use change to
forested areas. The recently enacted Environmental Liability Act
(2013) also requires offsets, but only when impacts are not
predicted or approved in the EIA and are deemed an environ-
Figure 1. Countries selected for the study (in color). In dark grey, countries for which offset frameworks have been established. Countries’
names have been abbreviated to the codes set by ISO 3166.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107144.g001
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mental offence. Since this is not a part of the environmental
licensing process we have not included it in our assessment. The
general law on ecological balance and environmental protection of
1988 (most commonly known as the LGEEPA) also enables the
use of offsets as does the Official Mexican Rule NOM-120-
SEMARNAT-2011 which makes some provisions for offsets
related to mining projects. Neither of these two laws can be
considered a specific offset framework since they only enable the
use of offsets but do not make any specific requirements or
guidance for when or how they should be used.
In Peru a new law about to be passed requires offsets for certain
projects subject to EIA, and provides details on how such measures
shall be implemented. Although the law is not currently enacted,
we have included it in this study since it establishes a new offset
framework that is different from the other country level programs.
Offset design is a complex process that entails multiple
challenges. Several principles have been outlined to guide this
process, the most widespread being the ones set by the Business
and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) [32]. However,
applying theoretical guidance into practice often proves difficult,
as when trying to translate best practice principles into effective
policy requirements. Several challenges, which may be especially
tricky for policy making, have been identified and discussed in the
scientific literature (see [33,34]). We want to contribute to this
discussion by evaluating how the selected policies deal with these
challenges, and how the theory we know may help improving legal
frameworks.
Following the approach outlined in McKenney and Kiesecker
2010 [33] and Bull et al. 2013 [34] we distilled a set of criteria that
constitute main current challenges and at the same time are key to
policies which seek to ensure that offsets provide the following
values: (1) they provide additional replacement for unavoidable
negative impacts of human activity on biodiversity, (2) they involve
measurable, equivalent biodiversity losses and gains, and (3) they
achieve, as a minimum, no net loss of biodiversity. Following these
principles we identified twelve criteria (which include most of the
ones listed by the above cited references, plus two additional ones)
that we used to assess the current state of offset frameworks in our
four target countries (Table 2).
Table 1. Current policies reviewed for the selected offset frameworks.
Country Year Document reference What it regulates
Brazil 2000 Law 9985 Sets the obligation for projects subject to environmental licensing of
offsetting impacts by making payments to support the National
System of Protected Areas
2002 Decree 4340 Regulates calculation of offset payments, sets the need of an Offsets
Chamber, and establishes how to use offset funds
2004 Direct action of unconstitutionality 3378 Partially modifies Art.36 1 1u of Law 9985 (original one declared
partially unconstitutional)
2006 CONAMA Resolution 371/06 Sets guidelines for the environmental authority to calculate, collect,
use, approve and manage offset funds related to Law 9985
2006 Decree 5746 Regulates offsets for impacts to Natural Heritage Reserves
2009 Decree 6848 Modifies Decree 4340
2010 Ordinance 416 Creates the Environmental Offsets Federal Chamber (CFCA)
2010 Ordinance 458 Designates the representatives of each organization that compound
the Environmental Offsets Federal Chamber (CFCA)
2011 Ordinance 10 Regulates the selection of environmental non-governmental
organizations that will be part of the Environmental Offsets Federal
Chamber (CFCA)
2011 Ordinance 225 Creates the Environmental Offsets Federal Committee (CCAF)
2011 Normative Instruction 8 Regulates the Environmental Offsets procedure set in Decree 4340
and modified by Decree 6848
2011 Normative Instruction 20 Regulates the administrative procedures for setting the terms of
commitment regarding offsets
2011 IBAMA Ordinance 16 Sets the bylaws of the Environmental Offsets Federal Committee
(CCAF)
Colombia 2010 Resolution 1503 Sets the obligation to follow the instructions of the ‘‘Manual for
allocating offsets for loss of biodiversity’’ for implementing offsets in
projects subject to EIA
2012 Resolution 1517 Approves the Manual for allocating offsets for loss of biodiversity
Mexico 2003 General Law on Sustainable Forestry Sets the obligation of making offset payments for land-use change of
forest areas
2005 Regulation of the General Law on Sustainable
Forestry
Sets the basis for regulating offset payments for land-use change of
forest areas
2005 Agreement on offsets equivalency Sets the method for calculating the required offsets area
2011 Agreement on offsets costs Sets the reference costs for calculating the required offset payments
Peru 2014? Offsets law [to be passed] Sets the basis for offsetting impacts to biodiversity in projects subject
to EIA (categories II and III)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107144.t001
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Results
Policies Related to Application of the Mitigation
Hierarchy
All the surveyed countries have national-level EIA laws or
regulations that cover all the habitats present in their territories. In
addition some have also developed specific EIA or environmental
management regulations for particular types of development, e.g.
energy and mining (see Table S1). As Figure 2 shows, most
environmental policies related to licensing processes in the
reviewed Latin-American countries have been enacted in the last
ten years. None of the countries have explicitly established a
general goal of no-net-loss or net-gain for the EIA process. Only
the general EIA regulations of Chile, Colombia and Mexico
specifically mention the complete mitigation hierarchy (avoid,
minimize, restore, offset) although none of them explicitly requires
adherence to it.
Cumulative/Indirect Impacts and Impact Significance: Several
countries make provisions for evaluating strategic development
plans under their general EIA regulations (Chile, Decree 40 of
2013; Peru, Supreme Decree 019-2009-MINAM; Mexico,
LGEEPA of 1988; Venezuela, Decree 1257 of 1996). Some
sector-specific policies require the assessment of impacts from a
landscape perspective (see Table S1), but for most the scale of
impact assessment is not clearly stated. Only Brazil, Chile and
Peru include provisions for assessing indirect impacts as part of
their general EIA policies, although Argentina and Colombia add
that requirement in some of their sectorial policies (roads and
hydrocarbons, respectively). Cumulative impacts are required in
all EIAs in all countries except for Argentina and Chile. Although
Argentina includes assessment of cumulative impacts under Law
26331 of 2007 on native forests and some sector-specific policies.
When it comes to how to evaluate impact significance Argentina,
Brazil, Colombia and Peru provide some guidance, although only
Colombia and Peru include that in their general EIA policies. In
most cases, this guidance consists of a list of environmental assets
that should be tackled in impact evaluation (e.g. soils, wildlife), or a
list of impact characteristics that should be evaluated (e.g. positive/
negative, medium/long term). However, more detailed guidance
can be found in some sector-specific regulations, especially in the
case of Argentina (see Table S2 for details).
Avoidance: Our results indicate that environmental licensing
provisions targeted at the hydrocarbon sector have the strongest
requirements for avoidance of impacts followed by provisions
targeted at all energy-related development. These sectorial policies
frequently include guidance and recommend activities to avoid
impacts, although these requirements vary greatly among coun-
tries. The rest of sectorial policies do not seem strong regarding
avoidance (Figure 3), and in some countries specific policies for
certain sectors have not been found (Table S1). Only in two cases
(Resolution 1604/2007 on environmental assessment and man-
agement for road projects in Argentina, and Resolution 1288 of
2006 on the TOR for EIS of electric lines in Colombia) do laws
clearly state that avoidance shall be prioritized over all other forms
Table 2. List of criteria used for the assessment of the reviewed offset frameworks.
Criterion Description Discussion and Recommendations
Offset goal Setting a target outcome (i.e. no-net-loss) and
requirements for demonstrating achievement of
biodiversity goal
Offset framework should set specific measureable target goals and goals
should be measured against dynamic baseline, incorporating trends. Ideally
net-gain, but at least no-net-loss, of biodiversity should be required [32]
Thresholds Requirements to determine threshold for which
biodiversity offset are not acceptable
Offset frameworks should acknowledge there are things that cannot be offset
and thus define criteria for when the use offsets is not appropriate and
avoidance or minimization should be applied [32]. These criteria could include
the irreplaceability of biological resources or the irreversibility of the impacts
[34]
Offset currency Metrics for measuring biodiversity Offset valuation should use multiple or compound metrics and incorporate
measure of ecological function as well as biodiversity [34]
Equivalence Requiring equivalence between biodiversity losses
and gains
Offset should not allow ‘out of kind’ trading unless this involves ‘trading up’
from losses that have little or no conservation value. Adherence to the ‘‘like-
for-like or better’’ principle is recommended [10]
Offset timing Deciding in which moment offsets should be
implemented
Ideally, offsets should be implemented in advance of the project so that their
benefits are already in place when impacts occur [51,68]
Time lag Deciding whether an additional offset for the
temporal loss is required in case there is a
temporal gap between impact & offset gains
There is no way of completely offsetting the possible negative consequences
of time lags. However, where offset benefits cannot be delivered prior to
impacts it is often recommended that offset value should be discounted to
account for temporal loss [56]
Offset longevity Deciding how long offset schemes should
endure
Offsets should last at least as long as the impacts of development and should
be adaptively managed for change. Ideally, they should be permanent [32,33]
Uncertainty Establishing requirements for managing for
uncertainties throughout the offset process
Uncertainty may be avoided by implementing offsets in advance. When this
proves not feasible increasing offset ratios may minimize uncertainty over
offset gains, although the effectiveness of this approach is still being discussed
([51]
Additionality Ensuring that offset actions result in additional
conservation outcomes that would not have
occurred without the use of an offset
Ideally all offset actions should seek to provide additionality [32]. Policies
should require project developers to demonstrate the gains achieved through
offsets.
Link to landscape-level
conservation goals
Ensuring offsets benefit broader landscape level
conservation goals
Offsets should seek to complement landscape level conservation goals [42]
Offset monitoring Requiring post implementation monitoring
to track progress of projected offset benefits
Offset frameworks should always seek to monitor projected returns for a
period long enough to ensure the offset values have reached maturity
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107144.t002
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of mitigation (See Table S3 for details). Apart from this, most
provisions related to impact avoidance are found in habitat-
specific or protected areas policies, which establish general
thresholds for what can or cannot be done in certain habitats
(such as wetlands) or in proximity to protected areas.
Minimization and Restoration: Similar to avoidance it is laws
directed at the energy sector that includes the highest percentage
of provisions regarding minimization and restoration. For most
countries no provisions for minimization or restoration require-
ments are found in the other sectors. Many of the provisions that
refer to minimization or restoration in the general environmental
licensing process occur in reference to habitat-specific documents.
Most commonly, those policies set a list of environmental assets
that shall be restored if negatively impacted. While a few laws
make specific recommendations for certain projects it is typically
in reference to how those activities shall be carried out or establish
performance standards to be met (e.g. survival rates for
reforestation activities). See Table S4 for details.
Offsets: Although most countries enable the use of offsets only
Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru explicitly require their
Figure 2. Timeline of the policies included in the study. The graphic represents the number of policies related to the environmental licensing
system enacted per year on each of the studied countries. Revoked policies have not been included. Countries’ names have been abbreviated to the
codes set by ISO 3166.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107144.g002
Figure 3. Median and standard-deviation of avoidance provisions in current sector-level policies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107144.g003
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implementation for specific impacts. In Chile some basic
provisions are established in the national EIA regulation (see
Decree 40 of 2013), although more specific guidance is being
developed by the Ministry of the Environment. Detailed guidance
is provided by Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Peru all of which
have specific regulations regarding offsets. These countries all
include regulations that are already implemented or in the case of
Peru are about to be passed into law. None of these regulations is
sector-specific. While Brazilian and Mexican policies are aimed at
impacts to specific natural assets, Colombia and Peru have a
broader scope. For more details see section on offsets below.
Monitoring: While all countries require the use of EIA and
many have requirements that emphasize the use of offsets few have
explicit language requiring monitoring of development impacts
and mitigation activities. Some countries add provisions specific to
particular sectors explicitly requiring post-project monitoring, but
such information is lacking in most general-scoped EIA policies.
Several of the documents that make provisions for monitoring
require specific activities to be included in the plan (schedule,
indicators, human resources, etc.). Some policies state when the
monitoring activities should be performed (e.g. construction and
closure phases), but only three documents were found to set the
duration of monitoring activities, which ranged from 3 to 10 years
after the completion of the project or implementation of the
mitigation activities (See Table S5 for details).
Offset Specific Review
Overview by country. Brazilian and Mexican schemes are
the first for which specific offset policies were enacted and in turn
include a relatively high number of policy documents (especially in
the Brazilian case). In marked contrast the Colombian and
Peruvian frameworks are recent, and have few policy related
documents (See Table 1 and Figure 4). Here we consider the
aspects of country-level offset policies highlighting aspects that
promote conservation outcomes. Table 3 summarizes the results
that are described below with more detail.
In Brazil all projects subject to EIA can utilize offsets and those
EIAs shown to cause negative impacts on protected areas must
implement offsets according to the scheme set by Law 9985. The
effective implementation of the offsets can be carried out either by
the developer (Normative Instruction 20 of 2011, article 11) or by
the agency responsible for managing the protected area (ICMBio
[Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity Conservation] in the case
of Federal Protected Areas). Offsets will always be aimed at
supporting conservation units of the National System of Protected
Areas (SNUC, by its Brazilian acronym; Law 9985). During the
time this system has been operational, it has generated over
US$200 million to be invested in protected areas (Gustavo
Pinheiro, personal communication).
In Colombia offsets are required for all projects subject to EIA
that cause significant impacts on terrestrial ecosystems (Resolution
1517 of 2012, second article). The developer of the project is
responsible for implementing the offsets, although the location is
decided by the National Environmental License Authority (ANLA)
in accordance with the provisions set in the regulation [35]. The
newly enacted framework provides guidance for offset design and
includes a series of rules developed for selecting offset sites that
meet the conservation needs of potentially impacted biological
targets (i.e. size, condition, landscape context) as well as rules for
impacts to offset ratio determinations based on a structured and
transparent approach [36]. Offsets can either benefit the National
System of Protected Areas (SINAP) or be independent of it
[35,36].
In Mexico offsets are always required for land-use change in
forest areas (Ley General de Desarrollo Forestal Sustentable 2003).
The agent responsible for offset implementation is the National
Forest Commission (CONAFOR by its Spanish acronym)
(Reglamento de la Ley General de Desarrollo Forestal Sustentable
2005), which decides the allocation of offset funds in projects
implemented by different entities (agrarian communities, land
owners, public administrations, research and education institutions
and NGOs among others). There are no requirements for
Figure 4. Number of policies related to each country’s offset framework issued per year. Includes both current and revoked policies.
Countries’ names have been abbreviated to the codes set by ISO 3166.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107144.g004
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integrating offset activities into broader conservation priorities,
and payment to the Mexican Forest Fund is the only tool enabled
for developers to comply with the legal requirements regarding
offsets (Ley General de Desarrollo Forestal Sustentable 2003). In
2013, approximately US$ 30 million have been allocated in
reforestation projects related to this offset scheme [37].
In Peru most projects subject to EIA would be covered under
the new law, although this is subject to the discretion of the
Ministry of Environment and EIAs can be exempt from inclusion.
The proposed law establishes that the developer be responsible for
implementing the required offsets. Offsets are not required to be
integrated into existing conservation priorities. While the law
enables the developer to directly implement offsets, it also makes
provisions for the creation of conservation banks.
Overview by Offset Criteria. Our review of the key offset
criteria (Offset Goal, Offset Currency, Equivalence, Offset
Timing, Time lag, Offset longevity, Uncertainty, Thresholds,
Additionality, Linking offsets to Landscape-level conservation
goals, Monitoring) suggests that relative to the idealized form of
the regulations there are both situations when criteria appear to
conform and many opportunities where regulations can be
improved.
Offset Goal: not all the reviewed frameworks explicitly state the
objective of compensatory mitigation, and only Peru and
Colombia set no-net-loss and net-gain of biodiversity as goals for
offsets. To ensure they meet these goals it will be necessary to
include a framework to adjust impact to offsets ratios (see ‘‘Offset
currency’’ subsection below).
Offset Currency: acreage seems to be the most common
currency for calculating the equivalence between impacts and
offsets. None of the reviewed Latin-American frameworks
incorporates ecological function (e.g. carbon storage, water
purification) of either the impacted sites or of the offset sites as
part of the valuation process. In the case of Colombia, a set of
acreage ratios (from 1:4 to 1:10) has been developed according to
the national significance of the impacted ecosystems [36].
Regulatory guidance on this issue has yet to be developed for
Peru. While not driven by a goal of no-net-loss in Mexico, the
Agreement of 2005 establishes a set of acreage ratios (from 1:1.3 to
1:6) that are calculated according to eight criteria: ecosystem type,
degree of conservation, presence of endangered or threatened
species, affected ecosystem services, proximity to protected areas,
project characteristics ( = how its design affects the area), degree to
which soil and vegetation resources are affected, and benefits the
project will bring to the area (environmental, or social). These
ratios are used to calculate the payment that the developer must
make to the Forest Fund (Agreement of 2011).
Equivalence: in-kind offsets are explicitly prioritized in the
Colombian and Peruvian frameworks, and each country uses a
different method for calculating the equivalency between impacts
and offsets. In the case of Colombia, offsets are required to match
impacted ecosystems [36]. The new law in Peru does not include a
detailed calculation system but defines a list of variables (e.g. type
of habitat impacted, priority areas for conservation and ecosystem
services,) that will have to be considered when selecting area to be
used for offsets(see Annex II of the Law). The Brazilian approach
Table 3. Summary of results of the review of offset frameworks by country.
Brazil Colombia Mexico Peru
Offset goal Balancing project impact on
protected areas with equivalent
gains on the SNUC
Biodiversity no-net-loss Balancing land-use change
of forests with equivalent
forest gains
Biodiversity no-net-loss or net-gain
Offset currency Finance-based Area Forest area and restoration
cost
Area
Equivalence Does not prioritize in-kind In-kind Since the money goes into
a fund, equivalency is
supposed but not
monitored
In-kind
Offset timing Payment shall be made within
10 days from the date the ToC are
signed. Direct implementation by
the developer shall be done
within 120 days from that date
(deadline can be extended)
When environmental license is
approved
Time lag Allows for the use of CBs to reduce
losses due to time lags
Offsets longevity Considered permanent, as they
benefit the SNUC
For the length of the project For the duration of impacts
Uncertainty Allows for the use of CBs to reduce
uncertainty
Thresholds Sets exclusion areas
Additionality Requires demonstrable gains
Link to landscape-level
conservation goals
Linked to the SNUC Coordinates with country’s
conservation portfolio
Foresees coordination with
national conservation priorities
Offset monitoring Requires comparing results
against base line
Transparency Offset projects and license
applications shall be made public
A public register of offset
places will be set
A public register of offset places
will be set
SNUC: National System of Protected Areas in Brazil; ToC: Terms of Commitment; CBs: conservation banks.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0107144.t003
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includes calculations of how much money developers shall put
towards offsets depending on the significance of the impacts
resulting from the development activities (Decree 4340 of 2002,
Decree 6848 of 2009), but there is no way of assessing the
equivalence between impacted assets and offset measures.
Offset Timing: provisions regarding when offsets are imple-
mented are not present in all the reviewed frameworks, and when
they are they tend to be somewhat ambiguous. In Brazil, time
limits for proving offset implementation or payment are condi-
tioned to the signed terms of commitment. But that date is not
clear so there is no way of knowing if offsets are implemented
before or after the project impacts occur. In Peru offsets shall be
implemented when environmental license is approved, which
probably means before the project impacts occur, although this is
not completely clear.
Time lag: none of the reviewed Latin-American frameworks
includes provisions regarding time lags, although in the case of
Peru the implementation of a national network of conservation
banks, where offsets credits are generated before impacts are
incurred, could help address this issue.
Offsets longevity: both Colombia and Peru clearly state the
minimum duration of offsets. In Colombia offsets should last at
least for the length of the project, while in Peru they are required
to match the duration of the impacts. Although the topic is not
specifically addressed in Brazil, benefits can be considered
permanent since they benefit the National System of Protected
Areas.
Uncertainty: none of the reviewed Latin-American offset
frameworks includes provisions regarding uncertainty, although
in the case of Peru the implementation of a national network of
conservation banks would help address this issue.
Thresholds: only Colombia has set clear limits as to what can be
offset.
Additionality: only Peru explicitly requires demonstrable gains
that ensure that the offsetting process results in additional
conservation outcomes.
Linking offsets to landscape-level conservation goals: Colombia
is the country that clearly establishes the link between offsets and
broader conservation plans, although Brazil also requires measures
to benefit the Protected Areas System. Peru includes some broad
guidance on this issue, although specifics have not been set yet,
probably because they will be developed in forthcoming regulatory
guidance.
Monitoring: provisions regarding post-implementation moni-
toring of offsets are scarce, and only Colombia requires results to
be compared against the area ecological baseline. In Mexico, the
CONAFOR is responsible for supervising offset project imple-
mentation and that they meet the agreed terms. None of the
frameworks establishes specific time requirements for monitoring.
Discussion
Previous studies by Tanaka in 2010 [38] and The Biodiversity
Consultancy in 2013 [39] identified 56 countries in the world that
have or are developing national legislation or policies around
offsets. In Latin America five territories required the use of offsets
(Brazil, Colombia, French Guiana, Mexico and Paraguay), nine
enabled the use of this tool (Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba,
Guyana, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay and Vene-
zuela), and three were developing policies related to offsets
(Bahamas, Chile, Belize and Peru).
Our review of environmental licensing and offset policy
frameworks in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru
and Venezuela shows that these systems have been evolving
recently (see Figure 2), although not yet adequate in all cases. We
have found significant variation on how EIAs are utilized, the
importance of adhering to the mitigation hierarchy, offset goals
and approaches for addressing key challenges to implementing
offsets. Despite this divergence most countries have a sound
foundation from which to develop policy for biodiversity offsets,
but several issues require further guidance, including how best to:
(1) ensure conformance with the mitigation hierarchy; (2) identify
the most environmentally preferable offsets within a landscape
context; (3) determine appropriate mitigation replacement ratios to
ensure that biodiversity losses and gains are equivalent; and (4)
ensure appropriate time and effort is given to monitor offsets
performance.
EIA frameworks
The ability of an offset framework to deliver conservation
outcomes for biodiversity depends heavily on the existence of a
strong Environmental Impact Assessment process. This is because
the EIA process is key to ensure that all significant impacts to
biodiversity are accounted for and balanced through the
application of the mitigation hierarchy [40]. When the EIA
process is weak or lacking, offsets may fail to deliver potential
value. Our review revealed several important flaws in the EIA
process. For example, some of the surveyed countries do not
require all EIAs to consider indirect impacts. Indirect impacts are
impacts on the environment, which are not a direct result of the
project, often produced away from or as a result of a complex
pathway. In the case of building a new road, for example, they not
only include environmental pressure exerted by the road itself
(impacts on vegetation, wildlife and the physical environment etc.),
but also the land occupied by producers of road construction
materials e.g. mining operations providing the road base materials.
These impacts are generally off-site, and may even occur a great
distance away from the direct impacts of development. But failure
to consider indirect impacts underestimates environmental
impacts and can obviously undermine any attempt to achieve a
goal of no-net-loss [41]. Most countries also fail to incorporate the
mitigation hierarchy as part of the EIA process. Grounding
decisions squarely in the mitigation hierarchy will ensure that
offset usage conforms to necessary conservation outcomes [42,43].
Only the EIA regulations of Chile, Colombia and Mexico properly
reference the complete mitigation hierarchy (avoid, minimize,
restore, offset) although none of them explicitly requires adherence
to it.
Mitigation hierarchy
Offset frameworks clearly need to emphasize the importance of
the mitigation hierarchy—avoiding and minimizing/restoring
impacts before proceeding to compensatory mitigation—without
reference to the hierarchy in the EIA process there is little
opportunity to ensure projects conform to it. Most guidance tends
to focus on avoiding impacts to ‘‘difficult-to-replace’’ and ‘‘high
significance’’ resources, but ultimately provides wide discretion to
regulatory authorities on decisions about when to avoid, minimize,
or offset [33,42,44]. Our review has shown that while advancing
quite detailed offset policies, countries do not seem to have strong
requirements regarding impact avoidance. Avoidance require-
ments found in environmental licensing policies were not very
strong according to our survey (see Figure 3), and it has only been
found to be explicitly required in two of the offset frameworks
reviewed (Colombia and Peru). Several authors have suggested
that if not implemented according to the mitigation hierarchy and
a set of standards, the expanded use of biodiversity offsets could
provide a ‘‘license to trash’’, allowing development in areas where
Environmental Licensing and Offset Policies in Latin America
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 9 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e107144
impacts should have been avoided or more effectively minimized
[33,45,46]. We propose that the strengthening of avoidance
requirements in mitigation frameworks will require the inclusion of
explicit statements requiring adherence to the mitigation hierarchy
and prioritization of avoidance measures in policies related to the
environmental licensing process (both general and sectorial).
Additionally, offset policies should also address this issue from
the perspective of avoiding impacts on elements that cannot be
replaced or for impacts that are themselves irreversible [32,34,47].
Such guidance should focus on common species as well as rare and
species at risk of imminent extinction as proposed by Regnery et
al. [48]. Guidance should also incorporate science-based criteria,
irreplaceability and vulnerability, examined through a systematic
conservation planning framework as put forward by Kiesecker et
al. [42]. Latin American countries are not alone in their lack of
strong policy and regulation related to avoidance. There is broad
agreement among scholars, scientists, policymakers, and regulators
that in most mitigation frameworks the first and most important
step in the mitigation hierarchy, avoidance, is ignored more often
than it is implemented [33,44].
The No Net Loss goal
Offsets are intended as the last option for addressing environ-
mental impacts of development after efforts have been undertaken
to minimize impacts on-site through application of the other steps
of the mitigation hierarchy: avoid, minimize, restore [6]. They
seek to ensure that inevitable negative environmental impacts of
development are balanced by environmental gains, with the
overall aim of achieving a net neutral or positive outcome [33,49].
As a goal, no-net-loss or net-positive-impact provides a benchmark
against which the scope and effectiveness of mitigation actions can
be measured. Without a goal, mitigation is simply a collection of
actions; there is no clear basis for assessing which actions are more
important to take (to achieve what?) or how much is enough.
Impact and offset accounting will matter greatly in evaluating a
project’s progress toward its goal. It is worth noting that no-net-
loss accounting is not an entirely new frontier: the principles
underpinning mitigation accounting are similar to those developed
for greenhouse gas emissions accounting (see for example ‘‘net
positive climate impacts’’ [50]). The goal of a mitigation
framework should be the first thing to be clearly set by the
policies that regulate it [51]. Our results show that most mitigation
policies do not define their environmental goals, and only in the
cases of Colombia and Peru are these goals clearly defined in their
offset policies. This lack of information about policy goals has also
been noted for other countries and other environmental regula-
tions [52]. This is a major subject to be addressed in future policy
development. Only when goals are clearly defined can mitigation
measures be properly designed, and progress evaluated.
Offsets timing and habitat banks
While there remain many offset accounting challenges that need
to be addressed e.g. timing and permanence of offsets, significant
progress is being made driven by science and practice [53–55].
One of the most effective ways of avoiding these problems is to
implement offsets in advance so that they deliver conservation
benefits before the impacts occur. However, provisions regarding
when offsets shall be implemented are not present in many of the
reviewed frameworks, and when they are, they are not clearly
stated. Adding a clear requirement for implementing offsets in
advance of project impacts should be a priority for future policy
updates in all the countries reviewed. However, impact prediction
may not be accurate, and offsets that were implemented in
advance may have to be adjusted as real impacts are evaluated in
the field. Adaptive management will play a key role in this regard
(see subsection about monitoring). From the business perspective,
delivering offset benefits before impacts occur may be impractical
under some circumstances, as they require long time to be fully
established. Business objectives are also subject to change as
markets fluctuate making detailed development plans challenging
to assess proactively. But where offsets are implemented after
project work begins it will be important to minimize losses due to
time lags. Sometimes the use of multipliers (e.g. increasing the size
of the offset) has been proposed to balance the losses due to time
lags [56,57]. However, recent research suggests that this approach
does not guarantee against the shortages triggered by temporal
delays that can threaten the achievement of meaningful offset
gains [54,55]. Habitat banks (also called ‘biodiversity banks’,
‘conservation banks’ or, in the US, ‘mitigation banks’) may help
reduce uncertainty and the need to consider time lags because they
provide the opportunity to implement anticipated offsets: by the
time a credit is bought the offset activities it accounts for have long
been implemented. Habitat banks also provide advantages to on-
site and small parcel mitigation. By consolidating necessary
services to create, maintain, and monitor, habitat banks are able
to provide services at a lower cost [51,58]. Because habitat bank
credits are created prior to impacts, purchasing credits from a
habitat bank decreases permitting time [59]. The cost of achieving
a certain level of performance and duration is often lower than
other offsets options and regulatory burden and risk is passed from
developer to habitat bank. We propose that habitat banking can
help implement offsets and provide positive conservation outcomes
that may not have been achieved otherwise [60]. For example,
buying habitat banking credits is sometimes the only feasible
offsetting option for small companies which have no capacity to
carry out offset projects by themselves. More importantly, habitat
banks aggregate multiple offset activities into few, larger projects,
which are more likely to deliver conservation outcomes [61]. Such
aggregation would probably be harder to achieve through other
means. However, of all the reviewed countries only the new offset
law in Peru allows for the use of habitat banking (called
‘conservation banking’). Incorporation of this tool into existing
mitigation frameworks may improve the implementation of offsets
and gains for conservation.
Landscape scale
Historically mitigation has occurred primarily in a reactive
fashion at small spatial scales on a site-by-site basis but there is
general consensus among research and practitioners that mitiga-
tion should be a more comprehensive approach that considers
whole systems, anticipates impacts, and recommends effective
actions to keep our natural systems healthy [42]. Integrating
mitigation at a landscape scale moves beyond a project-by-project
approach to one that can support a dynamic vision consistent with
broader conservation goals. A landscape vision is essential because
it ensures that the biologically and ecologically important features
remain essential throughout the process. Without this vision, the
sight of the overarching conservation targets is lost, establishing
priorities becomes difficult, and limited resources may be
squandered. In this sense, the Colombian and Peruvian offset
frameworks are progressive, as they have been developed from a
landscape conservation perspective. These frameworks also
require offsets for impacts to all natural ecological systems.
Compare this to the use of offsets in the United States, where
offsets are typically only used to address impacts to wetlands and
for threatened species. These new frameworks in Colombia and
Peru can serve as an example to be followed by future offset
policies not only in Latin America but globally.
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Moving forward, we hope that offset frameworks develop
guidelines that prompt practitioners to think strategically about
offset site selection, and to develop practical guidelines for how to
select offset sites. Site selection for offsets should be an exercise in
landscape ecology. Using quantitative site selection tools [62,63],
or blending this process as part of landscape level conservation
plans, to provide a transparent, flexible and rule-based approach
towards guiding site selection. Moreover, if political pressures
constrain practitioners to a particular political extent, quantitative
site selection tools will allow them to assess if meeting goals are
possible given those constraints [49]. When it comes to offsets,
failure to systematically select suitable sites could reduce the
potential benefits for conservation.
Monitoring
Post-implementation monitoring should be a key component of
every mitigation framework. Monitoring is a way of ensuring
compliance with policy requirements, evaluating the achievement
of the mitigation goals, and getting feedback on the effectiveness of
the activities implemented [34,64]. It is also the primary driver of
adaptive management, a necessary procedure for getting long-
term conservation outcomes [33,46,65]. In some way, it is also an
essential component for transparency of the process, since the
public does not only need to know which activities are proposed
and how mitigation funds are allocated (information that many of
the reviewed countries already provide for offsets), but also if and
how such actions are carried out. However, the lack of post-
implementation monitoring is a common problem in mitigation
and conservation projects in general [44,66]. Even when follow-up
programs are required, they are often required for a short period,
and because of the short temporal scale problems with offset
implementation frequently go undetected [54]. Many of the
countries in our survey lack provisions that guide the monitoring of
impacts and mitigation measures, and the few cases that do require
monitoring typically require short monitoring periods. Lack of
enforcement of environmental policies related to offsets is a
common problem [58,67]. The requirement of solid monitoring
processes is the first step to address these issues and will need to be
key component of any mitigation policies if they are to promote
sustainable development.
Conclusion
Our results indicated that all the surveyed countries have
national-level Environmental Impact Assessment laws or regula-
tions and most enable the use of offsets but only Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico and Peru explicitly require their implementation. While
several countries may have quite detailed offset policies, most
countries do not seem to have strong requirements regarding
impact avoidance which could undermine the use of offsets. While
the most recent frameworks (those from Colombia and Peru) show
more adherence to the theoretical recommendations we outlined
there are still some principles that have not been included in most
country level frameworks. In some cases, this may be due to the
lack of scientific agreement on how to address certain issues in
practice. To ensure that the use of offsets advances biodiversity
conservation going forward it will be necessary to develop further
guidance on how best to: (1) ensure conformance with the
mitigation hierarchy; (2) identify the most environmentally
preferable offsets within a landscape context; (3) determine
appropriate mitigation replacement ratios; and (4) ensure appro-
priate time and effort is given to monitor offsets performance.
Despite these shortcomings most countries have a strong
foundation from which to develop policy for biodiversity offsets.
In addition to these issues the Business and Biodiversity Offsets
Program, by far the largest multi-stakeholder effort to examine
biodiversity offsets, stresses the importance to ensure that offsets
involve stakeholder participation, the fair and equitable distribu-
tion of offsets benefits and use of traditional knowledge in offset
design. While we agree these are important issues they were not
included in our analysis given our focus on the theoretical scientific
issues involved in offset design.
Although policies and regulatory guidance alone will not deliver
conservation value without regulatory oversight and implementa-
tion capacity. The effectiveness of an offset program demands a
responsible administrative entity with firm requirements for
adequate oversight, performance accountability, and process
transparency and fairness. Achieving these objectives requires
several administrative functions, including: 1) communication and
maintenance of standards and protocols; 2) application of
standards to individual projects to analyze impacts and determine
needs for mitigation; 3) coordination and oversight of mitigation
planning to target mitigation funding toward projects with high
conservation return on investment; 4) oversight of mitigation funds
to ensure appropriate fiduciary management and impartial
allocation; 5) a process that utilizes monitoring and provides a
mechanism to adjust activities based on monitoring results; and 6)
procedures for sanctions against failure to achieve legal require-
ments to make sure that laws are effectively implemented. An
independent third-party entity that oversees these functions will be
essential.
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36. Saenz S, Walschburger T, González J, León J, McKenney B, et al. (2013) A
Framework for Implementing and Valuing Biodiversity Offsets in Colombia: A
Landscape Scale Perspective. Sustainability 5: 4961–4987. doi:10.3390/
su5124961.
37. CONAFOR (2013) Programa de Compensación Ambiental por Cambio de Uso
del Suelo en terrenos Forestales. Available: http://www.conafor.gob.mx/portal/
index.php/tramites-y-servicios/apoyos-2013. Accessed 2013 Dec 20.
38. Tanaka A, Ohtaguro S (2010) Biodiversity offsets that enable strategic ecological
restorations - Current situation of institutionalizing biodiversity offset in various
countries and its implications to Japan [in Japanese]. City Plan Mag 59: 18–25.
39. The Biodiversity Consultancy (2013) Government policies on biodiversity offsets.
Available: http://www.thebiodiversityconsultancy.com/wp-content/uploads/
2013/07/Government-policies-on-biodiversity-offsets1.pdf. Accessed 2014 Aug
4.
40. Jesus J de (2013) Mitigation in Impact Assessment. IAIA FasTips No.6.
Available: http://iaia.org/PublicDocuments/special-publications/Fastips_
620Mitigation.pdf. Accessed 2014 Aug 5.
41. European Commission (1999) Guidelines for the Assessment of Indirect and
Cumulative Impacts as well as Impact Interactions. Brussels. Available: http://
ec.europa.eu/environment/eia/eia-studies-and-reports/pdf/guidel.pdf. Ac-
cessed 2014 Aug 5.
42. Kiesecker JM, Copeland H, Pocewicz A, McKenney B (2010) Development by
design: blending landscape-level planning with the mitigation hierarchy. Front
Ecol Environ 8: 261–266. doi:10.1890/090005.
43. Kiesecker JM, Sochi K, Heiner M, McKenney B, Evans JS, et al. (2013)
Development by Design: Using a Revisionist History to Guide a Sustainable
Future. In: Levin SA, editor. Encyclopedia of Biodiversity. Waltham, MA,
U.S.A.: Academic Press. pp. 495–507.
44. Clare S, Krogman N, Foote L, Lemphers N (2011) Where is the avoidance in the
implementation of wetland law and policy? Wetl Ecol Manag 19: 165–182.
doi:10.1007/s11273-011-9209-3.
45. Walker S, Brower AL, Stephens RTT, Lee WG (2009) Why bartering biodiversity
fails. Conserv Lett 2: 149–157. doi:10.1111/j.1755-263X.2009.00061.x.
46. Quétier F, Lavorel S (2011) Assessing ecological equivalence in biodiversity offset
schemes: Key issues and solutions. Biol Conserv 144: 2991–2999. doi:10.1016/
j.biocon.2011.09.002.
47. Pilgrim JD, Brownlie S, Ekstrom JMM, Gardner TA, von Hase A, et al. (2013) A
process for assessing the offsetability of biodiversity impacts. Conserv Lett 6:
376–384. doi:10.1111/conl.12002.
48. Regnery B, Couvet D, Kerbiriou C (2013) Offsets and Conservation of the
Species of the EU Habitats and Birds Directives. Conserv Biol 27: 1335–1343.
doi:10.1111/cobi.12123.
49. Kiesecker JM, Copeland H, Pocewicz A, Nibbelink N, McKenney B, et al.
(2009) A Framework for Implementing Biodiversity Offsets: Selecting Sites and
Determining Scale. Bioscience 59: 77–84. doi:10.1525/bio.2009.59.1.11.
50. Climate Community and Biodiversity Alliance (2008) CCB Standards.
Available: http://www.climate-standards.org/ccb-standards/. Accessed 2013
Dec 12.
Environmental Licensing and Offset Policies in Latin America
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 12 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e107144
51. Bekessy SA, Wintle BA, Lindenmayer DB, Mccarthy MA, Colyvan M, et al.
(2010) The biodiversity bank cannot be a lending bank. Conserv Lett 3: 151–
158. doi:10.1111/j.1755-263X.2010.00110.x.
52. Brownlie S, Botha M (2009) Biodiversity offsets: adding to the conservation
estate, or ‘‘no net loss’’? Impact Assess Proj Apprais 27: 227–231. doi:10.3152/
146155109X465968.
53. Moilanen A, van Teeffelen AJA, Ben-Haim Y, Ferrier S (2009) How Much
Compensation is Enough? A Framework for Incorporating Uncertainty and
Time Discounting When Calculating Offset Ratios for Impacted Habitat. Restor
Ecol 17: 470–478. doi:10.1111/j.1526-100X.2008.00382.x.
54. Maron M, Hobbs RJ, Moilanen A, Matthews JW, Christie K, et al. (2012)
Faustian bargains? Restoration realities in the context of biodiversity offset
policies. Biol Conserv 155: 141–148. doi:10.1016/j.biocon.2012.06.003.
55. Gardner TA, Von Hase A, Brownlie S, Ekstrom JMM, Pilgrim JD, et al. (2013)
Biodiversity Offsets and the Challenge of Achieving No Net Loss. Conserv Biol
27: 1254–1264. doi:10.1111/cobi.12118.
56. Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP) (2012) Guidance Notes to
the Standard on Biodiversity Offsets. Washington, D.C. Available: http://www.
forest-trends.org/documents/files/doc_3099.pdf. Accessed 2014 Aug 5.
57. Overton JM, Stephens RTT, Ferrier S (2013) Net present biodiversity value and
the design of biodiversity offsets. Ambio 42: 100–110. doi:10.1007/s13280-012-
0342-x.
58. Norton DA (2009) Biodiversity offsets: two New Zealand case studies and an
assessment framework. Environ Manage 43: 698–706. doi:10.1007/s00267-008-
9192-5.
59. Latimer W, Hill D (2007) Mitigation banking: Securing no net loss to
biodiversity? A UK perspective. Plan Pract Res 22: 155–175. doi:10.1080/
02697450701584337.
60. Wende W, Herberg A, Herzberg A (2005) Mitigation banking and compensa-
tion pools: improving the effectiveness of impact mitigation regulation in project
planning procedures. Impact Assess Proj Apprais 23: 101–111. doi:10.3152/
147154605781765652.
61. Dickie I, Tucker G (2010) The use of market-based instruments for biodiversity
protection - the case of habitat banking. Technical report. Available: http://
www.ieep.eu/assets/472/eftec_habitat_banking_technical_report.pdf. Accessed
2014 Aug 5.
62. Arponen A, Kondelin H, Moilanen A (2007) Area-based refinement for selection
of reserve sites with the benefit function approach. Conserv Biol 21: 527–533.
63. Moilanen A (2013) Planning impact avoidance and biodiversity offsetting using
software for spatial conservation prioritisation. Wildl Res 40: 153. doi:10.1071/
WR12083.
64. Hayes N, Morrison-Saunders A (2007) Effectiveness of environmental offsets in
environmental impact assessment: practitioner perspectives from Western
Australia. Impact Assess Proj Apprais 25: 209–218. doi:10.3152/
146155107X227126.
65. Hilderbrand R, Watts A, Randle A (2005) The myths of restoration ecology.
Ecol Soc 10: 19.
66. Ferraro PJ, Pattanayak SK (2006) Money for Nothing? A Call for Empirical
Evaluation of Biodiversity Conservation Investments. PloS Biol 4: e105.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0040105.
67. Burgin S (2008) BioBanking: an environmental scientist’s view of the role of
biodiversity banking offsets in conservation. Biodivers Conserv 17: 807–816.
doi:10.1007/s10531-008-9319-2.
68. Morris RKA, Alonso I, Jefferson RG, Kirby KJ (2006) The creation of
compensatory habitat—Can it secure sustainable development? J Nat Conserv
14: 106–116. doi:10.1016/j.jnc.2006.01.003.
Environmental Licensing and Offset Policies in Latin America
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 13 September 2014 | Volume 9 | Issue 9 | e107144
